Cuba's Foreign Policy after the Castro Era: Revolutionary Continuity or Emerging Realism?

Abstract

Cuba’s foreign policy in recent decades has been defined largely within an ideological and revolutionary framework—one originally established by Fidel Castro following the triumph of the 1959 revolution and later maintained to some extent by Raúl Castro. This discourse has traditionally revolved around three main pillars: opposition to U.S. imperialism, support for leftist movements in Latin America and Africa, and an emphasis on political independence and self-sufficiency. However, following Raúl Castro’s withdrawal from power and the partial transition to a new generation of leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel, Cuba’s foreign policy has encountered new questions: Is it still rooted in the principles of the revolution, or is it shifting toward a new form of realism? This article explores whether Cuba’s post-Castro foreign policy reflects a "continuation of the revolution" or a "transition to strategic realism."

Using a critical discourse analysis approach and framed by constructivist theory, this study investigates the dominant narratives within Cuba’s foreign policy and interprets them within the context of broader structural and regional changes. The findings suggest that Cuba’s foreign policy in the post-Castro era is marked by a duality. On one hand, the Cuban diplomatic apparatus continues to employ revolutionary rhetoric, emphasizing resistance to U.S. unilateralism and the defense of socialism. On the other hand, economic constraints and international pressures have compelled Cuba to reconsider some of its diplomatic priorities. Especially in the wake of intensified U.S. sanctions and the decline of Venezuelan support, Havana has sought to strengthen more pragmatic ties with countries like Russia, China, Iran, and certain European nations—though these partnerships are still often presented within an ideological framework.